Building a Fan base

[kinsm]

From 1961 to 1995 (35 seasons - including 3 strike shortened) the Reds had 27 winning seasons, never losing more than 3 consecutive years in a row.

Over that period the Reds advanced to the NLCS 9 separate times and to the World Series 6 times - winning 3 rings.

Some of the greatest Reds in team history had their team tenure during this period, and not surprisingly there was very little turnover. Twenty-one different offensive players played in at least 750 games over that time span, including: Frank Robinson, Johnny Edwards, Vada Pinson, Leo Cardenas, Lee May, Tommy Helms, Tony Perez, Joe Morgan, George Foster, Johnny Bench, Cesar Geronimo, Ken Griffey Sr., Pete Rose, David Concepcion, Dan Driessen, Eddie Milner, Ron Oester, Paul O'Neill, Eric Davis, Chris Sabo, and Barry Larkin. In addition eleven pitchers started at least 150 games over that time span, including; Jim Maloney, Joey Jay, Jim O'Toole, Gary Nolan, Don Gullett, Jack Billingham, Fred Norman, Tom Seaver, Mario Soto, Tom Browning, and Jose Rijo.

During this period Reds attendance peaked at 32.5K/G...2.63 million in 1976 (the 5th NLCS in 7 years and a WS sweep). The city of Cincinnati had a population of approximately 420K that year (as opposed to approximately 290K today). The metro area had a population of 1.75M that year (as opposed to 2.2M today).

[kinsm]

In retrospect, in the 16 seasons since (not including 2012) the Reds have had just 3 winning seasons (and one .500). During this span they had a streak of 9 consecutive losing seasons and only one playoff appearance (being swept in the 2010 NLDS).

The only offensive players to have played in at least 750 games with the Reds over that span are: Sean Casey, Brandon Phillips, Adam Dunn, Ken Griffey Jr., and Barry Larkin. Whilst only Aaron Harang and Bronson Arroyo have amassed at least 150 starts with the Reds over that period.

[psuhistory]

Of the players in the first post, all had direct experience of the reserve clause except for Milner, Oester, O'Neill, Davis, Sabo, Larkin, Soto, Browning, and Rijo. After 1975, clubs couldn't use labor control as part of their branding strategy, the end of MLB's long nineteenth century...

[kinsm]

Jun 11, 2012 17:43:30 GMT -5 psuhistory said:

Of the players in the first post, all had direct experience of the reserve clause except for Milner, Oester, O'Neill, Davis, Sabo, Larkin, Soto, Browning, and Rijo. After 1975, clubs couldn't use labor control as part of their branding strategy, the end of MLB's long nineteenth century...

Yep, at which point GM's actually had to do a job.

[schellis]

Personally I think GMs had more to do prior to FA. With the Reserve clause in place GMs couldn't just throw money at a good player to fill a hole.

From the start of the draft to the start of FA I consider the period where baseball was the most competitively balanced.

If you drafted well and traded well you'd win and be able to maintain your potential championship window for far longer then a smaller market team can today.

[kinsm]

Jun 14, 2012 10:06:31 GMT -5 schellis said:

Personally I think GMs had more to do prior to FA. With the Reserve clause in place GMs couldn't just throw money at a good player to fill a hole.

From the start of the draft to the start of FA I consider the period where baseball was the most competitively balanced.

If you drafted well and traded well you'd win and be able to maintain your potential championship window for far longer then a smaller market team can today.

How did they have more to do? Draft and Trades are the same things they do now but now they also have free agency.

Baseball was more balanced (IYO) because large market teams couldn't buy FA's.

[schellis]

They had more to do because they couldn't count on FA to cover their mistakes. Meaning that when they drafted or traded for players they had to make the right moves more often then not if they wanted to field a competitive team.

[psuhistory]

I don't think it's ever been an easy job, but labor control certainly made it easier. Before the draft, clubs routinely made disastrous decisions about the allocation of bonuses but could avoid the worst consequences by keeping the bonus below the sanctioned threshold and by their control over the players already on the active roster. Most clubs experienced free agency as a debilitating, more or less assured loss of talent from the active roster, rather than as an opportunity to fix problems. After 1975, more clubs would more consistently have to face the consequences of their mistakes...